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Moreover, Britain appeared to detach itself from post-war efforts to foster European unity and did not perceive it as a necessary requirement for obtaining peace and progress. On the contrary, its application for membership of the European Economic Community was a tacit and convenient agreement, a move determined by obvious financial concerns rather than an expression of attachment to European goals or a decision made out of concern for Europe's future. This lack of enthusiasm was reflected in political discourses and British media prior and post accession.
Although Churchill played a great role in Franco-German post-war reconciliation that later lead to the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community and the European Economic Community, he did not cease to emphasize the British national sovereignty by stating that "…we have our own dream and our own task. We are with Europe, but not of it. We are linked but not combined. We are interested and associated but not absorbed." (Churchill, 1930) The fact that the British EC accession had a very practical dimension that contained almost no emotional commitment can be clearly seen from the way in which the accession subject was treated in the British press at the time. On January 1 st 1973 The Guardian wrote with uncanny detachment "We're in-but without the fireworks. Britain passed peacefully into Europe at midnight last night without any special celebration. It was difficult to tell that anything of importance had occurred, and a date which will be entered in the history books as long as histories of Britain are written, was taken by most people as a matter of course." (Mckie and Barker, 1973) The British long march towards Europe included two failed attempts in 1963 and 1967 and was marked by Britain's inability to decide whether it should keep its close ties with USA or join the European bloc. When eventually Britain decided to join the EEC, it retained its special connection with the USA. According to Churchill, maintaining this tight connection should represent a priority for the British government in foreign affairs and this position has been later adopted by Thatcher, Blair and to a certain degree even by the current PM, Theresa May. (Troitino,
2018)
Keeping its pragmatic stance, Britain sought to secure for itself a privileged position within EEC and later within EU by managing to opt out of the European Monetary System, the Eurozone and Schengen, enjoying several opt-outs in the areas of justice, security and freedom as well.
Moreover, Britain's opt-outs were never simple demands that emanated from its member state position but elaborated conditioning plans as it was the case in 1992 when its decision to opt out The current study attempts to identify the reasons why the state with the most opt-outs in the EU, to which the EU legislation applies selectively, would leave all its privileges in the hands of a popular vote. Why would Britain trade its "special status" gained through decades of exceptional diplomatic efforts for a public decision heavily influenced by brutal domestic politics and "Leave"
campaigns that took advantage of a very unfortunate EU context?
In order to answer this question we will focus our analysis on emphasizing the differences and similarities between the two British referendums (1975, 2016) considered to be issues that should be submitted to a popular vote. Yet, after only two years of joining EEC, Britain decided to organize in 1975 its first referendum on membership. On the other hand, the anxiety created by this crisis warned that leaving the EEC might have disastrous repercussions for the British economy which will no longer have access to the market.
Therefore, probably one of the loudest arguments in favor of remaining during the 1975 referendum was the fact that Britain had no other viable alternative to stop its economic decline but to continue its redevelopment plans within the European economic environment. Although there was no certainty that British economy will prosper within EEC, remaining inside the community appeared to be for many Brits the only rational choice. Moreover, after experiencing only two years of membership the British population could not draw yet a conclusion on whether continuing as a member would be beneficial or not for them and had to rely on the information provided by the political elite. In order to answer these questions, we will center our analysis on several pivotal elements that came into play at the time when the two referendums were held. Firstly, this comparative synthesis would look at the motivation that each PM had in order to initiate renegotiations and later pledge for referendums. Secondly, we will compare the two referendum campaigns by examining several forces that shaped the decisions of the British voters such as: the immigration issue, the national sovereignty issue and the role played by the media during referendum campaign.
Renegotiation of EEC/EU Membership and referendums
According to Butler and Kitzinger, "referendums are imperfect devices for making basic decisions about the direction in which a country should move." (Butler and Kitzinger, 1996) When there is a great disagreement within a party coalition regarding the desired direction, this "imperfect device" becomes a political tool that mediates between parties assuring an instant boost of popularity and legitimacy. Thus, as Dennis Kavanagh concluded, "referendums have more to do with political expediency than constitutional principle or democracy". (Dennis, 1996) The Labour administration that replaced Heat's government in 1974 had very heterogeneous views regarding EEC membership, a fact that determined the newly elected PM at that time, Harold
Wilson, to promise his colleagues that he will renegotiate the terms of membership and make them the subject of a national referendum. More than four decades later, David Cameron would repeat the same offer but with a very different outcome. (Saunders, 2018) The renegotiation process initiated by Prime Minister Harold Wilson had very clear objectives (see Table 1 ). Namely, he wished not to reform the EC but to create an opportunity for his Eurosceptic party members to reconsider their opinions. (Saunders, 2016) His demands were focused mainly on economic issues that were considered to be disadvantageous for UK. The UK contribution to the EEC Budget National parliaments able to work together to block unwanted EU legislation Following negotiation in Brussels, both Prime Ministers returned home claiming that they have secured better deals for Britain hoping this will convince people to vote for remaining but this tactic had little success. Then as now, the economic issues were at the heart of the debate. However, in 2016 Britain was more prosper unlike EU, which was experiencing numerous crises that severely affected its economy.
If in 1975 at the heart of the referendum debate was people's fear of losing national sovereignty and their jobs coupled with the fear of increased prices, in 2016 there was a lot more to be feared.
Probably one of the most salient issues that were debated during the 2016 debate was the campaign was far more complex and the decision to leave more consequential. As Brexit talks are touching key issues, the tensions during negotiations are increasing also suggesting that Britain will most probably have to leave the EU on rather acrimonious terms.
More than two years after Brexit, the British cabinet still has no clear direction regarding the deal it wants with EU but the general message both parties are conveying seems to tell us that at the moment there is definitely no time for "bregrets". Additionally, all the hope that was invested in May's ability to negotiate a convenient trade agreement with the EU seems to slowly fade away especially after the recent EU summit in Salzburg. May's refusal to give up on her Chequers Brexit plan coupled with the intransigency of the European side had deepen the gap between the two sides which most probably will result in a hard Brexit with no deal reached until the October EU summit.
The pressure that came from the trade unions and left-wing activists determined Jeremy Corbyn, 
